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GAME THEORY AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH:
SOME MUSINGS 50 YEARS LATER
MARTIN SHUBIK
Yale School of Management, 56 Hillhouse Avenue, P.O. Box 208281, New Haven, Connecticut 06520, martin.shubik@yale.edu
By its very nature, a discursive reminiscence has to besomewhat self-referential. Furthermore, it cannot offer
an exhaustive survey of the many special topics to which
it may refer. Rather than suffer “strangulation by footnotes
and references,” for brevity and equity I do not provide
references to subjects such as auctions, the new industrial
organization, or experimental gaming because there are
more than adequate references and survey articles available.
When I first skimmed The Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior in 1948, I did not really understand it, but I
sensed that this was the way to go in the study of multiper-
son conscious strategic behavior. I had heard a little about
operational research casually in 1944 in two applications:
one concerning how to aim an anti-aircraft gun to take
account of the plane’s motions during the time it took to
reach it after firing, and I had a vague idea that one could
try to analyze the best ways for convoy defense by using
some form of mathematics.
The visit to the main library at the University of Toronto
to look randomly at the new books in economics led to
my going to Princeton to study game theory. To this day,
I have been struck with the thought that it is possible to
not know precisely what one is looking for, but recognize
immediately when one finds it.
At Princeton, there was some direct talk about operations
research per se, and only a few of us were aware of the
newly formed Operations Research Society. But in a few
years around Fine Hall (and elsewhere), much of the math-
ematics relevant to its development was being developed.
Among the visitors, students, and faculty were Bellman,
Feller, Gomory, Karlin, Kemeny, Kuhn, McCarthy, Mills,
Minsky, Nash, Scarf, Shapley, Tucker, and Tukey. Dynamic
programming, linear programming, convex programming,
integer programming, inventory theory, game theory, arti-
ficial intelligence, and applied probability were all being
developed.
While still at Princeton, and then when at the Institute for
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and at General
Electric in the period between 1953 and 1958, I was con-
vinced that the methods of game theory were going to have
a broad impact, not only on operations research but on the
behavioral sciences in general. I suggested the applicability
of game theory methods to operations research (Shubik
1953a, 1958a), economics (Shubik 1953b, 1953c), politi-
cal science (Shubik 1954), management science (Shubik
1955), law (Shubik 1956), simulation (Shubik 1958a) and
the decision sciences (Shubik 1958b).
A basic problem that has beset the publication of
applications of operations research from its inception (in
both the United States and the United Kingdom) has been
the intermix between academic theorizing and practice.
The introduction of the journal Mathematics of Operations
Research provided a way to relieve Operations Research
and Management Science of an overburden of the body of
mathematical theory developing to deal with specific sub-
disciplines in operations research such as inventory theory,
linear, and integer programming. The creation of a special
Practice Section in Operations Research in 1984 attempted
to make sure that there would be some segment of the jour-
nal devoted to the “real world.” Michael Rothkopf (1994),
in a valuable survey article, discussed some of the reasons
why practitioners may not write for the open literature.
Recently Omerod and Kiossis (1997) carried out a com-
parison of the nature of the publications in both United
States and United Kingdom publications and concluded that
there were possibly even fewer publications of results in
the United Kingdom than in the United States.
Because my main purpose is to cover the evolution of the
relationship between game theory and operations research
rather than to review all of operations research, I limit my
broader comments on operations research with a few Pan-
glossian remarks. It is my belief that operations research
has been so successful that it may have put itself out of
business, at least in its easy-to-recognize sense. It has suc-
ceeded to the extent that it is taught in a more or less
routine and watered-down manner in every business school.
Linear programming, queuing studies, and elementary com-
petitive models go with the turf.
Consulting firms flourish. A variety of military opera-
tions research firms make a good living off weapons anal-
ysis; specialist firms such as Fair Isaac have found a
niche in credit evaluation; McKinsey dispenses general-
ized operations research and management science under
a variety of names. RAND, Stanford Research Institute,
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Los Alamos, and many others may not be in their heyday—
as they were when operations research was young and
100% improvement in performance almost anywhere was
to be expected—but they still produce. Small groups of aca-
demic consultants provide consulting services in the design
of auctions or in the structuring of games to study market
structure.
Our “flagship journals” are academic journals, and the
incentive structure for most practitioners to publish their
findings in them is minimal. Validation in application is
probably better measured by a repeat order from a cus-
tomer than a publication in Operations Research. The goals
of academics in operations research and the goals of prac-
titioners are basically different and can be appreciated only
when placed in the context of the organizations for which
they work, their reward systems, and their life styles.
I am reminded of one event that happened to me at
General Electric and another that happened to George
Feeney at Stanford Research Institute. I was complain-
ing to one of the vice-presidents that in spite of the fact
that General Electric in the 1950s had hired a first-class
group of operations researchers, the management, except
for Harold Smiddy (Smiddy and Naum 1954 is still worth
rereading), did not appreciate us. Jack McKitterick replied
that the trouble with the executives at General Electric was
that they had not understood the basic motivation of the
group they had hired. He said if they had to do it over
again they would have paid us half as much but would have
hired a special manager to stroke us and go around telling
each of us how smart we were. George Feeney’s experience
at Stanford Research involved explaining what operations
research was to one of their vice-presidents, who reacted
immediately. “I see,” he said, “operations research involves
utilizing big minds to work on small problems.” Both of
these observations may be regarded as flippant, but both
contain just enough truth to be worth considering. Kirby
(2000, p. 666), in a recent article, has noted that part of the
crisis in OR from the 1970s to 1990s was that it had failed
to capitalize on its wartime strategic profile. “To the extent
that most peacetime work had been ‘tactical’ it had been
consistent with a gradual slippage of status of OR groups
in relation to senior management.”
This article is being written some 14 years after an
address given at The Institute of Management Sciences
meeting in New Orleans in 1987 (Shubik 1988). I realize
that even then my views of the relevance of operations
research in general and game theory in particular had
changed when compared to my advocacy in the 1950s. In
the 1950s, especially in economics (less so in operations
research), game theory was looked upon as a curiosum not
to be taken seriously by any behavioral scientist. By the
late 1980s, game theory in the new industrial organization
had taken over. The floodgates had broken as streams of
specialized papers poured out and subindustries in auction
theory, agency theory, bargaining, the new industrial orga-
nization, voting theory, and competitive mechanism design
proliferated.
The third millennium has arrived; game theory proved its
successes in many disciplines. The big gains were made.
There is much in the way of valuable special results still to
be obtained. But much in the same way as one can regard
the limited views and models of classical economics, and
the one-person conscious optimization problems that char-
acterized much of operations research as calling forth the
development of game theory, the limitations of game theory
have indicated that many of the big problems for which it
was designed need to be answered in a manner that can
best be described as “post-game theory.”
The new game theory in operations research applications
lies in the study of organizations and in systems that involve
individuals, networks, and institutions. The success of game
theory in supplying the language for the study of informa-
tion and providing the basic concept of strategy has led to
our understanding the limitations implicit in the model of
the fully informed rational individual decision maker. The
vistas opened up by the formalization of the concepts of
player, information set, strategy space, and extensive form
led us to gaming, simulation, and artificial intelligence. The
stress will be on individuals with limited capacity, optimiz-
ing locally in many special contexts where expertise and
learning count.
Economic man, operations research man, and the game
theory player were all gross simplifications invented for
conceptual simplicity and computational convenience in
models loaded with implicit or explicit assumptions of sym-
metry, continuity, and fungibility to allow us (especially in
a precomputer world) to utilize the methods of calculus
and analysis. Reality was placed on its bed of Procrustes
to enable us to utilize the mathematical techniques availa-
ble. Fortunately, there were many important problems in
military OR and mass economies that fitted comfortably
into this picture. Cooperative game theory utilizes combi-
natorics, but once one considers games with more than 5
or 10 differentiated players, the calculations involving all
coalitions quickly become unwieldy.
After my stay at the Institute for Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences, rather than return to academia
I decided to join General Electric, where an operations
research group was being formed explicitly to provide
internal operations research consulting. There were active
operations researchers at Columbia, among them David
Hertz and Sebastian Littauer, and in Princeton, the group at
Mathematica, where game theory thinking was considera-
bly in the fore.
It was my experience as a consultant at General Electric
that led me to reformulate my thoughts along the lines indi-
cated in my 1984 talk and paper. The key questions seemed
to me to be: “What is an application?” and “When is theory
a waste of time?” To some extent, I felt that the distinction
between management science and operations research was
at best fuzzy, but if there was one it was one of emphasis
and professional view. The management scientist had to be
more “management friendly.” This boiled down to paying
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considerable attention to context and to some extent, hand-
holding. What were the real problems faced by the man-
ager, and which were the big problems? Furthermore, did
the management recognize the importance of the problems
in the same way as the consultant, or was the consultant
merely a Cassandra who might take some pride at a later
date in his ability to predict disaster without any ability to
prevent it?
The operations researcher appeared to be more con-
cerned with applying the appropriate solution techniques to
pre-posed problems with little regard to becoming involved
in the judgment of how important they were. In the OR
applications in World War II, this division of labor was
clearly not there. The great power of the military operations
research at that time (as is shown in Morse and Kimball
1970, Kirby 2000, Blackett 1962, and others) was that the
operations researchers were closely concerned with for-
mulating the problems and evaluating how important they
were. Similar observations, combined with questions con-
cerning the obtaining of data within an organization, have
been raised in the discussion of the CONDOR report (Com-
mittee on the Next Decade in Operations Research). The
discussion of Wagner et al. (1989) notes the change in the
interface between OR practitioners and the organizations.
In “the old time operations research,” problem formula-
tion, understanding how good the data were, and where the
data came from were critical responsibilities of the practi-
tioner in the formulation and clarification of ill-perceived
problems.
As a game theorist with a special interest in the eco-
nomics of oligopoly, I sailed into General Electric with
a whole tool kit of strategic interaction models inherited
from a peculiar set of Jesuitical exercises much enjoyed
by young mathematical economists teething on conjectural
variations. There were Cournot reaction dynamics, Bertrand
dynamics, Stackelberg variations, Chamberlin embellish-
ments, and then all the embroidery one could add if one had
been taught enough about difference and differential equa-
tions. But they were all cut out of the whole cloth, and their
connection to economic reality was tenuous at best. Possi-
bly one of my best teachers and friends was Harlan Mills,
who had a wonderful feeling for the appropriate abstraction
of reality. It was from Harlan that I heard the golf expres-
sion, “Drive for show, but putt for dough.” Translated into
English, this was a way of saying that details mattered and
the ability to understand the precise aspects of the problem
at hand was critical to its solution.
General Electric had switched to five-year planning and
as a gung-ho young game theorist, I could see no rea-
son why not 10 or 15 years. It took me many moons
to finally understand that long-range planning takes place
now and that there is a constant updating as information
comes in. Furthermore, as new information comes in there
is a considerable feedback between the information and the
updating of the plans. Even more important, because the
contingencies proliferate so fast as we go out in time, there
have to be methods for pruning the branches to be followed.
Few long-range plans can afford the luxury of working out
more than a few alternative paths. Once even the most staid
of firms goes out more than a few years into the future,
the planning becomes more of an exercise that provides a
broad definition of intentions and moral imperatives than
an exercise in operations research.
I enjoyed my years at General Electric, and the exercise
of looking carefully at many different plants in a variety
of industries vastly increased my respect for those who
knew their business without necessarily knowing any of
what passed for theory. From there I went to the IBM
research laboratories where a fine group of mathematicians
and operations researchers were located. At IBM, several
items concerning both my perceptions of the role of long-
range planning and competitive analysis, and about my own
professional interests and desires, became clear. My col-
leagues were a pleasure to be with, but unlike at General
Electric, we were no longer mixed in with the “troops in
the front line.” We were neither managers nor consultants.
I knew I did not want to be a manager and possibly did
not have the appropriate talents to be one even if I had
wanted to go that way. I started to work on a purely abstract
problem that was of great fascination to me. This was on
the development of a basic theory of money. It appeared
to me that there was a great gap in economic thought on
the treatment of money and that, although I did not know
how, I suspected the techniques of game theory could be
applied. While at IBM, I made no visible progress on this
topic.
My other interests at IBM were in experimental, teach-
ing, and operational gaming and in developing a theory of
bidding. It seemed to me that gaming provided a useful
way to teach the insights of game theory and to provide
a way to organize concepts and data on the structure of
markets. I believe to this day that eventually a good plan-
ning department of any major corporation should utilize a
simulation of the corporation and its market as a device to
organize perceptions and data, to help formulate questions,
and to facilitate communication among practitioners.
Bidding and auctions appeared to several of us in the
early 1960s as a natural subject for the application of game
theory techniques. Since that time, the literature has prolif-
erated, and a case can be made that it has been of value in
OR application.
My decision to accept an attractive offer to re-enter
academia was based on two features. I believed that
my comparative advantage was in seeking out funda-
mental problems and chasing basic conjectures, hopefully
encouraging others to develop the mathematics required
to establish the conjectures or to exploit the models. This
occupation does not have an immediate corporate or mili-
tary payoff. Furthermore, the environment at Yale offered
far greater freedom than either IBM or GE for my pur-
poses. In making the move, I followed my own precepts
and observations concerning the uses of long-range plan-
ning and game theory—good major decision-making calls
for the understanding of environment (both physical and
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human). At best we find ourselves facing a partially
controlled stochastic process where nature or plain luck
accounts for a large part of the variation and other individ-
uals account for a segment that may or may not be as large
as that of nature. The basic problem faced by the individual
or corporation is: does he, she, or it have a clear picture of
what he, she, or it wants to do locally in the next few years?
Individuals frequently complain that they never experi-
ence good luck. One hypothesis is that they are unable
to recognize good fortune even when it stares them in
the face.
I came to Yale permanently in 1963 and am still here.
I am more and more appreciative of the amazing contribu-
tion of game theory to the behavioral sciences in general
and to OR in particular. But I am more sensitized to under-
standing that A’s big problem may be B’s small problem
and furthermore that B’s big problem may be regarded by
A as a quaint academic irrelevance. So it is with game the-
ory and its applications. A brief look at the last 10 years
of Operations Research and Mathematics of Operations
Research shows a little more than 20 articles that can
be classified as game theory in operations research. They
are in search theory, some military OR, and the rest in
the new industrial economics and some on joint costs,
assignment, and bargaining. During the same period, there
were around 40 game theory papers in Mathematics of
Operations Research, essentially all of which were techni-
cal and for the theorists. But before we draw conclusions,
we need to ask what we care about and why.
Some years ago, it was suggested that game theory could
be categorized in at least three forms. They are:
High church game theory. (Publications in Mathematics
of Operations Research fit here.)
Low church game theory. (The new industrial organiza-
tion qualifies here.)
Conversational game theory. (This deals loosely with pre-
formalized vague but strategic problems.)
All three have had impact. But it is the third that has
made its way into the language of every consultant and
has caught the imagination of the public. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern did not invent cooperative game theory
for consulting purposes. The two key solution concepts,
the Shapley value and the Nash noncooperative equilib-
rium, were not constructed to solve any specific problem
at hand. (To this day, the importance of the Shapley value
is grossly underestimated. It is the natural combinatoric
extension of the concept of marginal productivity.) At the
time I, not being a mathematician but being concerned with
applications in the social sciences, saw their potentials and
had the good fortune to work with both Shapley and Nash
in applying these solutions to the concept of voting power
and to the economics of oligopolistic competition. A lit-
tle later, I observed the possibility of applying the value to
the assignment of joint costs and to accounting incentive
problems.
When consulting at RAND, I read the notes of Tom
Schelling, which led to his book on the strategy of conflict.
I was deeply opposed to it at the time because it was (and
still is) loaded with basic errors and a misunderstanding
of elementary game theory. But what I failed to appre-
ciate at that time was that it was the work of a social
scientist willing to take the mindset of game theory seri-
ously but not willing to accept the rules of the game as
given. It is precisely the concern for context and the “games
within the game,” where the fuzzy meld of strategic—as
well as tactical—modeling took place in “the old operations
research.” Strategic analysis in application has no neat and
tidy rules to turn over to the boys writing the algorithms to
solve everything.
While at RAND, Brewer and I, in collaboration with the
General Accounting Office (Brewer and Shubik 1979), did
a survey of military gaming and simulation. We had the
resources to conduct a broad empirical study that enabled
me later to more fully appreciate Roth’s comment that one
of the basic purposes of gaming is “whispering in the ears
of princes.” A good study is part of the conversation in
activities such as weapons selection and evaluation and
force structure. Specious accuracy and tidy database pre-
sentations are part of the Noh-play scenario developed in
this use of conversational game theory dressed as high sci-
ence engineering. My advocacy and predictions for the use
of gaming and game theory in corporate planning groups
(Shubik 1975) have not been fulfilled, in part because I
grossly misestimated the organizational incentives, model-
ing, simulation, and data gathering problems.
At this time, certain forms of noncooperative game the-
ory have captured many of the applications in the design of
auctions and bidding, in industrial organization, in agency
theory and the design of incentive systems, and in parts
of the law. There has been a proliferation of experimen-
tal gaming in economics and industrial organization; oper-
ational gaming is still carried on by the military (but there
is a danger that the improvements in computer technology
have permitted war gaming models to become more rather
than less opaque. In spite of the rumors of its demise, or
a lack of public knowledge of its existence, cooperative
game theory and its many applications is thriving. These
applications include voting structure design, assignment
problems such as medical school admissions, overhead
costs, the pricing of pollution rights, aircraft landing pric-
ing, and computer system time-sharing pricing.
The 1950s–1970s were the halcyon days in the devel-
opment of operations research techniques in general and
game theory in particular. They were also the days when
the RAND Corporation, other not-for-profits, ONR, Bell
Labs, the General Electric operations research group, and
the T. J. Watson labs were in their prime. Today, the scene
has changed. The universities have had to shoulder much
more of the burden. Not only have the institutions changed,
but so have the subjects for study.
The successes of game theory brought with them a
deeper appreciation of the limits of the key models. A
few straightforward combinatoric calculations concerning
the proliferation of strategy sets tell us that individuals do
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not search strategy sets exhaustively; a little experience in
long-range planning lets us know that 10 strategies is a big
number—better stick to three or four, but show some taste
in selection and construction.
The current questions in post or new game theory
involve how we describe situations where there is not com-
plete common knowledge about the rules of the game,
where individuals have limited perceptual and computa-
tional capacities, where they do not know quite what
they want, where their priors are not well defined, where
they learn, where socio-psychological and even cultural
factors matter—in short, where they are somewhat fleshed
out human beings rather than computational powerful
automata. The development of computer simulation tech-
niques and the concern for dynamics and evolution are
moving us beyond the basic tools that provided us with
the language to understand the anatomy of information and
much of the structure of decision making. The new tech-
nology of computation and communication has enabled
us to see more clearly the importance of interlinked net-
works of individuals in contrast with the stress on the
maximizing individual in isolation. Increasing concern with
the rates of change in technology and the economy have
stressed the need to study viability, flexibility, and feed-
back in locally optimizing organisms. New institutions are
called for to succeed those of the 1950s and 1960s. It is
not clear that institutions at the cutting edge of research
can stay in their prime for more than 20 or 30 years. Cur-
rently, the Santa Fe Institute is attempting to move into
new territory. How it will succeed and what others will
join it are still open questions. But the time to move on is
now.
Most of the individuals writing in this issue have much of
their careers behind them. But many of them, though rich in
experience, are still young in perception and thought. The
purpose of musing and summary is not to bury a subject but
to understand what has been learned and how to utilize the
body of knowledge and understanding to start to explore
the vistas it has opened up.
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